Purpose -The study aims to quantify the possible interactions between the three European objectives in the horizon of 2020: (i) the reduction of 20% of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) (2) the saving of 20% of the European energy consumption and (3) a share of 20% of renewable energies in the overall energy consumption. Particular focus is, however, placed on the influence of the CO 2 emission reduction targets and on their consequences on the carbon price in 2020.
Introduction
The European Council on the 8 and 9 march of 2007 decided to achieve three ambitious obligations for the 2020 horizon: (1) the reduction of 20% of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) (and up to 30% if an international agreement justifies it) (2) the saving of 20% of the energy consumption and (3) the share of 20% of renewable energies in the overall energy consumption. The key element of these ambitions, in relation to the fight against the climate change, is the reduction of GHG emissions (Criqui, 2007) . The European emissions trading scheme (EU ETS, thereafter referred to as ETS) includes the energy intensive European industries and the electricity producers. It represents at least 45-50% of CO 2 emissions in Europe and will remain, according to the European institutions, the key instrument in reaching Kyoto and post-Kyoto targets. By January 2008, the Commission has introduced the first proposals for national targets in the "20/20/20" policy, and negotiations are going on. This paper is a first attempt to comprehensively deal with the economic fundamentals of the threedimensional regulatory system proposed by the Commission for energy and climate.
For renewable energies, the Commission didn't specify the particular instruments for increasing the share of renewable energies to 20% in total energy consumption. However in recent years, the feed-in tariffs proved to be effective in increasing the development of renewable energies. Quota systems coupled with the exchange of "green certificates" (GC), which prove the origin of the production, also became an increasingly common instrument to facilitate the diffusion of renewable electricity . Market instruments are equally high on the agenda for stimulating energy efficiency and savings. An instrument, frequently identified in the academic and political debate, is the one of energy saving obligations coupled with the exchange of certificates representing the savings achieved and often denominated as "white certificates" (WC).
Increased energy efficiency while diminishing the whole set of externalities associated with energy production will consequently decrease the cost of GHG emission reductions 1 . Likewise increased utilization of renewable energies, which are justified for considerations of security of supply, employment or regional or local benefits could participate in the reduction of GHG emissions. Strong interactions exist, therefore, in terms of emission reductions, but also in terms of costs of programmes chosen to reach their respective objectives. Several studies have analyzed the possible interactions on theoretical grounds (NERA, 2005 , Doucet and Percebois, 2007 .
Additionally, the authors analyze the integration possibilities of different quota systems in Europe:
ETS, GC and WC. For the short term, they conclude in favor of separate quota systems for fear of double counting possibilities for one action undertaken as well as of the related complexities of integration, which, eventually, might dampen its benefits.
Our study does not analyze the integration of the three quota systems nor their specific design, but aims at quantifying the consequences of the objectives that Commission proposes for 2020. The evaluation of relative efficiency of market-based instruments such as taxes vs. tradable permits or certificates is outside the scope of the study. Therefore, we consider that the respective national objectives for energy savings and renewable energies are being realized with quota systems in every country: WC and GC systems, which represent the national implicit or shadow prices that would be required to attain the objectives. CO 2 emissions reduction is carried out within ETS and is consistent with the EU's commitment of 20% emission reduction by 2020.
In reality, the implementation of the three objectives will interact simultaneously. However, due to the intrinsic difficulties in the evaluation of superposed actions, we examine the impact of one objective on the implementation of another objective in a sequential manner. For that, we create a number of scenarios representing the introduction of the sole quota systems or a combination of quota systems introduced in a sequential manner. The priority for the introduction is, however, placed on energy savings that is WC systems since the reduction of energy consumption is often considered as a structural, low-cost reduction option (Bertoldi et al., 2005 ). The scenarios are tested with a combination of two modeling tools: the POLES world energy model and ASPEN, which is dedicated for the analysis of quota systems 2 . A static and competitive equilibrium environment is assumed for the study.
The paper proposes a comprehensive approach of the economics of the "20/20/20" European policy. It develops along the following: in section 1, we introduce the principal policies for reducing GHG emissions as well as increasing energy savings and renewable energies in EU; in section 2 we first explore the interactions among ETS, GC and WC systems in a theoretical perspective and then display the methodology for quantifying these interactions; section 3 later delivers and analyses the main results of this study; lastly, we present our main conclusions in section 4. The paper shows, in particular, that the energy saving and renewable quota policies (WC and GC) significantly decrease the European marginal CO 2 emission reduction cost and consequently, the compliance costs for ETS participants. It also shows that the sole carbon price signal has a limited influence for stimulating renewable energies and energy savings, thus, affirming once again the need for specific policies targeting these two areas 3 .
THE CONTEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN EUROPE: CLIMATE POLICIES, ENERGY SAVINGS AND RENEWABLE ENERGIES
EU is generally acknowledged for playing a strategic role in climate negotiations. The policies adopted at the European level are important not only for the emission reductions in the Member countries, but also for the development of the international climate regime. The lessons learnt in formulating the coordinated climate change policy at the European level, in particular the failure of the introduction of the carbon-energy tax in the early nineties, have lead to a reflection on alternative policies, also efficient and appropriate to market conditions (Andersen, 2005) . In establishing the ETS Directive and in proposing the quantitative objectives in the field of energy savings and renewable energies in 2020, the EU shows a marked preference for "cap & trade" or "baseline & credit" systems, where the quantitative objectives are known, but not the marginal costs of the actions to be undertaken, whereas with taxes, the accepted cost -at least the marginal cost -is known initially, but not the quantities to be eventually achieved (Weitzman, 1974) . In theory, the market-based instruments minimize the cost for the society when reaching a certain objective (static efficiency) and also provide the incentives for adoption and innovation of new clean technologies (dynamic efficiency) (Jaffe et al., 2003) .
The European emission trading system (ETS) in its regulatory context
The ETS is aims at providing an efficient way to be offered to the Member countries to ensure a significant part of their Kyoto obligations and to progress towards a low carbon economy in the future.
The system relies on the creation of a price for carbon emissions by establishing the market for emission allowances or quotas. From the economic point of view, the market solution allows minimizing the total costs of a particular programme since the exchange of quotas equalizes the marginal costs of reductions, while mobilizing only the least-cost options (Criqui, 2002) .
The ETS is supposed by the EU to achieve its Kyoto target at a cost of € 2.9 to € 3.7 billion annually (European Commission, 2004) . This is less than 0.1% of the EU's GDP. Without the scheme, compliance costs are evaluated at € 6.8 billion a year. The system was initially founded on six main principles 4 : (1) it is a "cap & trade" system, (2) its initial focus is on CO 2 emissions from large industrial emitters, (3) implementation takes place in two phases (2005-07 and 2008-12) with periodic reviews and opportunities for expansion to other gases and sectors, (4) the allocation plans (NAPs) are decided periodically by the Member countries in line with Kyoto objectives, but require the approval of the Commission, (5) it includes a strong compliance framework (the penalty for exceeding the quotas is fixed for the two phases € 40 and € 100/tCO 2 respectively), (6) ETS taps emission reduction opportunities in the rest of the world through the use of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) projects, and provides for links with compatible schemes in other Annex B countries (refer to Directive 2004/101/CE).
In operation, the ETS has shown itself so far to be an administrative success, with the overwhelming majority of installations reporting their independently verified CO 2 emissions and surrendering the appropriate number of allowances to cover them at the required deadlines (Environmental Audit Committee, 2007) . However, the emission reductions turn out to be less impressive. The verified emissions in 2005 showed that the CO 2 market was long of allowances and not short as it was anticipated in the beginning of the programme. The surplus of allowances was due to a combination of two factors: (1) generous national allocations and (2) effective internal reductions. The market analysts consider that the first factor was by far the most important (Point Carbon, 2007) , but some economic studies show that both factors have occurred, the second one even greater than the first one (Ellerman and Buchner, 2006) . In either case, the European authorities have retained the lessons from the first experimental phase; the Commission review process of the second round of NAPs for the 2008-2012 period turns out to be more vigorous, involving reductions of initial national quotas for almost every Member country. The definite success of the ETS will be principally judged on two elements: the emission reductions obtained and the appearance of stable carbon price.
The European policies for energy savings
The According to the Green Paper, EU could save 20% of its energy consumption in 2020 (European Commission, 2005a) . Experience shows that the diffused potentials for energy savings in the residential, service or transport sectors are not sufficiently exploited through the classical instruments used in numerous European countries -information of consumers, regulation, fiscal subsidies and incitations -because the feasible energy savings are not sufficiently valued by the decision-makers (Moisan, 2004) . Furthermore, with the gradual opening of electricity and gas markets to competition, the instruments for promoting efficient use of energy should be compatible with the market conditions. 
The European policies for renewable energies
Increasing the share of renewable energy sources in the final energy consumption and, in particular, in the electricity generation is also one of the Community's targets for 2010 as stated in the Directive of electricity production from renewable energy sources (2001/77/EC). The principal support schemes, adopted by Member states, comprise price-based feed-in tariffs (FIT), quantity-based quota systems or Green Certificates and, to a lesser extent, the calls for tenders and financial incentives.
The FITs allow the producers to sell the green electricity at a fixed price per kWh. This price or tariff is usually above the market price and is guaranteed for a number of years. The quota system or the GC system consists of: i. the establishment of quotas for the production of green electricity imposed on the operators intervening on the electricity market, i.e. distributors, retailers or producers-importers; ii. the flexibility associated with the trading of certificates among the operators under regulation. These can produce the desired quantity of green electricity, negotiate long term contracts with specialized renewable producers, or purchase certificates corresponding to a certain production of green electricity (Menanteau et al., 2002) .
In general, the GC systems were favored by the Commission because they satisfy the costeffectiveness rationale as well as unified market conditions comparing to FITs (Lauber, 2002) .
However, in a report of December 2005, the European Commission noticed that FIT regulations were very effective for promoting renewable electricity (European Commission, 2005b) . They have proven their effectiveness by enabling the marked growth of the installed production capacities. The important increases in the green electricity production have occurred in Germany and Spain, those countries with FIT policy. The quota systems with tradable certificates that were implemented in some countries have not shown comparable results 7 . Additionally, the costs proved to be higher in countries with quota systems than in countries with FIT regulation, which also reflects higher risks for operators of facilities (European Commission, 2005b) . Therefore, even if these systems present theoretical advantages, they remain complex to implement and operate well only if the necessary market infrastructure is very carefully developed. Several authors also indicate that GC systems introduced at the European level would probably be more efficient than those introduced at the national levels since a deeper market would produce more stable GC price and diminish the problems related to the fixing of adequate quotas (del Rio, 2005) .
On the other hand, some argue that FIT regulation, because they generate rents, might be inefficient in terms of allocative resource efficiency and offer only little incentives for the reduction of the production costs, despite their undeniable effectiveness in the push of green electricity production (Menanteau et al., 2002) . While both systems are said to have advantages and drawbacks, the discussion on which support system is best is not approached in this article 8 . The theoretic interactions among the three instruments: ETS, WC and GC are highlighted in the next section.
INTERACTIONS OF THE THREE REGULATORY SYSTEMS
Theoretical interactions have been analyzed in NERA (2005) . Here, we recapture the aspects relevant to our empirical analysis, and then develop a methodology for the taking into account of these interactions.
Regulatory interactions in theory The impacts of WC and GC systems on the overall CO 2 emissions and on the emissions in the ETS
The WC system alone can help to diminish the CO 2 emissions when the installations are not initially included in the ETS. The reduction of direct consumption of fuels in households and buildings fits well with a policy of emission reductions driven by a WC system. However, the limitation of network electricity consumption in households does not generate additional reductions because electricity is already included in the ETS. In theory, the WC system does not influence the reduction of emissions originating from ETS because the quota in ETS is defined ex-ante. Counting of the avoided emissions due to the WC system would result in double counting of CO 2 quantity since electricity saved also 7 Latvia (combined with FITs), Belgium, Italy, Poland, Sweden and United Kingdom.
8 For a discussion of FIT vs tradeable green certificates refer to: Butler and Neuhoff, 2005 , Midttun and Gautesen, 2006 , Lipp, 2007 , Ragwitz et al., 2007 reduces the emissions in the electricity sector under ETS. The displaced fossil fuel generation would free up ETS allowances that would be used to cover emissions elsewhere.
As to GC system for renewable energies, it would reduce CO 2 emissions only if the green electricity replaces polluting fossil-fuelled electricity generation. Indeed, the ETS already encourages indirectly low-carbon investment and punishes emitting technologies. However, ETS would spur the investments in renewable energy technologies only after all the low cost options have been exhausted on the market. Furthermore, the double counting problems would again appear if the emission reduction benefits were counted by the GC system (Sorell, 2003) .
The impacts of WC and GC systems on the costs of the overall and ETS CO 2 emissions reduction.
The introduction of the WC and GC systems might lead to the reduction of the demand for allowances in ETS and, consequently, of the CO 2 price on the market. The preceding takes place when the WC and GC systems "pay" for certain emission reductions via the decrease in polluting production.
Consequently, the allowance price and the compliance costs for the participants in the ETS are reduced. However, this decrease in costs does not mean that the overall costs of reducing emissions and achieving the cap is lower with certificate systems than without. The overall costs might even be higher, as the measures undertaken under WC and GC systems might be more expensive than those undertaken under the cost-minimizing optimum of ETS alone 9 . This situation is, however, less likely to occur for WC system since the majority of the reduction options are considered to be low-cost (Commission Europeans, 2005) .
The impacts of WC and GC systems on the electricity market in the ETS
The WC and GC systems may decrease the price of electricity if the energy savings achieved or the renewable technologies replace fossil fuel-based electricity generation. The reduced demand for electricity may then lead to a lower marginal production cost (or to a decrease in polluting production, which usually fixes the market price) and therefore to a lower price 10 . This decrease could be, however, compensated by the pass-through of costs related to energy-saving or renewable technologies. Typically, the increase in electricity price should be more important when the three systems are in force together rather than within each one. In the long term, the impacts on the electricity producing mix and its price are less clear since they depend from the investments in new generation capacities, which in return, depend partially from the expected costs related to environmental regulations. The following section introduces the methodology used for quantifying different interactions among the three objectives in Europe.
9 "If the measures incentivised by WC and GC systems were the most cost-effective available, then these measures would anyway be incentivised by ETS, without the need for additional programmes" (NERA, 2005) .
10 It depends on the merit order in the electricity production of every country.
9
halshs-00226208, version 1 -30 Jan 2008
A practical methodology for the simulation of regulatory interactions
In order to analyze the economic fundamentals of the triple system of regulation schemes in the "20/20/20" policy, it is first necessary to precisely derive national and European objectives in the field of energy savings, renewable energies and ETS so as the respective national and European prices to attain these objectives. Secondly, we define the scenarios that are relevant for the analysis of interactions among the three objectives.
National objectives for energy savings are defined with respect to the European objective announced by the Council: saving of 20% of the EU's energy consumption compared to projections for 2020 (Council of EU, 2007) . However, the share of the efforts needed by each Member country to achieve the European objective was not specified by the Council. In this study, we use the Reference scenario of the POLES model for the projections of primary energy consumption, which in a case without any 12 Besides green electricity, renewable objective comprises heat from renewable sources as well as utilisation of 10% biofuels. Only green electricity is incentivised in our study, but all renewable energy sources are added up for calulating their contribution in the final energy consumption later on in the Taking these indications into account, in our study we employ the indicative national targets for 2010 under the Directive of electricity production from renewable energy sources, which are compatible with the objective of 12 % share of renewable energies in the final energy consumption and, in particular, with a 21% share in the electricity consumption; then, we adjust the indicative targets so that they (Pizer, et al., 2003) and iii. the participation of non-Annex B countries through the emissions trajectories from the POLES reference scenario. For this latter category, no carbon constraints are imposed, but project-based mechanisms are allowed through CDM projects. However, only a restricted part of the theoretical potential is considered as potentially introducible to the market, due to high transaction costs that result from the lack of information or skilled personnel, political or economical obstacles, trade barriers or general politics of the developing country.
In order to quantify the possible interactions among the environmental objectives we have created a number of scenarios displayed in Table 1 . We notice that scenarios 2 to 5 are based on sole quota policies, while scenarios 6 to 9 consider the combination and different sequence introduction of such policies, although the priority is always placed on WC policy, which represents energy savings.
Scenarios 6 to 9 are performed according to the following steps, e.g. for scenario 9: i. using the POLES model, the series of successive simulations are performed with a linearly increasing tax on final energy consumption, the results of which is treated in ASPEN to derive national WC prices; ii. a new set of successive simulations, including national WC prices is performed with a linearly increasing carbon value and analyzed in ASPEN module in order to obtain European CO2 ETS price; and finally iv. the last set of sensitivity analyses including both WC prices and CO2 ETS price is performed with a linearly increasing FIT and analyzed in ASPEN in order to derive national GC prices. The three set of prices are then combined to produce a final simulation of scenario 9 "WC+CO2 ETS+GC". 
GC
Sensitivities of FIT applied to renewable electricity generation → national GC prices 5. WC Sensitivities of energy consumption tax → national WC prices 6. WC+GC National WC prices + ( Sensitivities → national GC prices ) 7. WC+GC+CO2 ETS National WC prices + ( Sensitivities → national GC prices ) + ( Sensitivities → European CO2 ETS price ) 8. WC+CO2 ETS National WC prices + ( Sensitivities → European CO2 ETS prices ) 9. WC+CO2 ETS+GC National WC prices + ( Sensitivities → European CO2 ETS prices ) + ( Sensitivities → national GC prices )
The distinction between scenarios CO2 total and CO2 ETS is the following: in the former, the objective of 20% reduction of CO 2 emissions is applied to all energy system sectors (ETS and non ETS) comparing to 1990 emission level (or 12.7% reduction based on 2010); in the latter, the objective of CO 2 emissions reduction for ETS sectors is calculated in line with the overall 20% objective and applied in ETS sectors (second NAPs are reduced by 11.7%) 14 . Therefore, CO 2 emissions in non ETS sectors are not addressed in this scenario, while in all following scenarios they are impacted either by WC or the combination of WC and GC quota policies, which indirectly contribute in reaching the overall 20% CO 2 objective. The full development of these scenarios opens up a diversity of interesting results, which are exposed in the next section of the study.
14 Energy system sectors comprise ETS (energy industries, manufacturing and construction industries) and non -ETS sectors (transport, commercial, residential, agricultural sectors).
RESULTS
To start with the analysis of the numerous results, we first refer to the implicit national WC and GC prices as well as to the European or international CO 2 prices. Afterwards, we look more closely at the effects of different scenarios on the CO 2 market, renewable energies and energy savings, as well as on the changes in the European electricity production mix.
Implicit prices of white and green certificates, price of CO 2
Energy savings by 20% comparing to the reference projections in 2020 result in relatively high national implicit WC prices shown in Table 2 15 . There, it has to be emphasized that these prices correspond to the marginal cost of energy savings, i.e. the cost of the last and most expensive action to be engaged in order to meet the target. Thus the implicit price doesn't reflect the average cost of energy savings, which -with convex energy saving supply curve of the type produced here -will be (far) inferior to half the marginal cost. We also notice that the WC prices are heterogeneous among countries, which would be a prerequisite condition for the establishment of a WC system at the European level. The introduction of WC trading among the countries would equalize the marginal costs of energy consumption reduction and result in a European WC price of 880 €/toe in 2020. The equilibrium burden sharing that would equalize the European WC price among the countries is also exposed in Table 2 . We recall however, that only national WC prices are taken into account in the rest of the study. .
Producing one third of electricity with renewable energy sources in 2020 would imply the implicit national GC prices shown in Table 3 . We recall that, as from Table 1 , there are three sets of GC prices, corresponding to different sequence introduction of renewable policy: (1) GC, (2) WC+GC (applying also to WC+GC+CO2 ETS), (3) WC+CO2 ETS+GC. Typically, the most important national and European GC prices are in the GC scenario since the accomplishment of the renewable objective is performed in an isolated way, without any other environmental policies. The introduction of the trading of GC among the European countries brings the European GC price down to 0.1 €/kWh 16 . This price decreases to 0.07 €/kWh in the scenario WC+GC, due to the impact of national WC prices, which stimulate energy savings and thus allow to shrink the basis used for the renewable target.
Finally, the implementation of energy saving objectives and CO 2 emission reduction objective in ETS in the scenario WC+CO2 ETS+GC reduces even more the European GC price to 0.05 €/kW. We notice that the carbon price signal created in the ETS (in combination of WC prices) reduces the renewable compliance costs of EU25 by 43% in the scenarios WC+CO2 ETS+GC compared to WC+GC. 
WC + CO2 ETS + GC WC + GC GC
Turning to the analysis of the CO 2 market, we now consider the price, emissions, project-based credits as well as the reduction costs (Table 4 ). Looking at the Table 1 , we notice that we should have four sets of CO 2 prices corresponding to scenarios: i. CO2 total, ii. CO2 ETS, iii. WC+GC+CO2 ETS and iv. WC+CO2 ETS (applying also to WC+CO2 ETS+GC). A distinction should be made between the first scenario CO2 total -where the CO 2 market is confined to Europe that is all the reductions or purchases of allowances are produced within the EU25 -and all other scenarios, for which the 2.2 international carbon market is assumed, as in section . Therefore, we observe in Table 4 , that the reduction objective or shortfall is highest in the scenario CO2 total compared to all other scenarios and amounts to 1329 MtCO 2 . The absence of project-based credits makes the realization of European objective of 20% emission reduction very costly in terms of reduction costs and CO 2 price, which in this case reaches 93 €/tCO 2 . The reduction objective as well as European marginal reduction cost is also high under the scenario CO2 ETS, since the carbon price only affects the ETS sectors. The import of project-based credits is, therefore, needed to alleviate the efforts of European industries.
However one can notice that the domestic European reduction far exceeds the purchase of projectbased credits with 531 against 309 MtCO 2 . This is explained by the new flexibility margins created by a longer time-period (2020) for the change in investment patterns, which compensates for the increasing pressure created by stronger emission reduction targets.
The required CO 2 emissions reductions as well as the marginal reduction costs decrease significantly in the last two scenarios. This is due to the introduction of the other environmental policies aimed at achieving European objectives of energy savings and renewable energies. The combination of WC and GC systems in the scenario WC+GC+CO2 ETS reduces the CO 2 emission shortfall by 73% compared to CO2 ETS and by 83% compared to CO2 total. The decrease is also important in the compliance costs for ETS participants. The combination of the three quota systems in the scenario WC+GC+CO2 ETS allow EU25 to reduce its emissions over its own target and sell the extra allowances on the international market. Nevertheless, the international carbon price is only slightly affected: it is of 31,2 €/tCO 2 in the scenario WC+CO2 ETS and of 30,5 €/tCO 2 in the scenario WC+GC+CO2 ETS, compared to 35,6 €/tCO 2 in CO2 ETS. The addition of GC prices next to WC prices in the scenario WC+GC+CO2 ETS has a minor impact on the international carbon price. 
Impacts on the fundamentals of the energy sector
The following analysis focuses on CO 2 emissions, renewable energies utilization and energy savings achieved under all scenarios listed in Table 1 . Therefore, Table 5 shows the results of final simulations that combine the prices from Tables 2 to 4, depending on different scenarios. From the environmental point of view, the Reference scenario would be a failure in all the three fields targeted by the Commission. Scenario CO2 total complies with the objective of 20% reduction in CO 2 emissions, it increases the renewable energy utilization to 15% in the final energy consumption and it saves 12% of primary energy consumption in 2020. The price to pay is nevertheless high: a carbon value of 93€/tCO 2 should be indeed imposed to all energy sectors (see Table 4 ). Scenario CO2 ETS, represented only by the actual ETS and a quantity of project-based credits that facilitates ETS participants' reduction efforts, diminishes the CO 2 emissions in EU25 only by 3%. The same scenario does even less for reducing energy consumption (only 5%) and increasing the use of renewable energies (14% in the final energy consumption).
In the scenario GC, represented by a regulated green electricity supply in Member countries, the renewable energy utilization grows to 17% of final energy consumption. However, this scenario discourages energy savings and CO 2 emission reductions. Besides the increases in energy savings, CO 2 emissions might be reduced by 6% in the Community under scenario WC as a result of relatively high national implicit WC prices (see Table 2 ). Two quota policies, represented by scenario WC+GC, further decrease CO 2 emissions to 13%.
The contribution of the international carbon market in the scenario WC+GC+CO2 ETS allows fulfilling the Council's expectations in all three targeted areas, but equally does the scenario WC+CO2
ETS+GC. The magnitude of the compliance cost reduction with the renewable target impacted by CO2
ETS price is larger (from 17499 M€ to 9834 M€ in Table 3 ) than the magnitude of the compliance cost reduction with ETS objective impacted by GC prices (from 6141 M€ to 3005 M€ in Table 4 ). Once WC policy has been implemented, for the same level of environmental performance WC+CO2 ETS+GC seems less costly to implement, with a total cost of 15976 M€ (for the joint CO 2 ETS and Renewable targets) to be compared with 20503 M€ in scenario WC+GC+CO2 ETS. Finally, we examine in Table 6 the changes in the European electricity production mix that is implied by the different scenarios. Typically, the electricity production is at its lowest in the last three 17 We notice from the results of final simulations shown in Table 5 that due to the dynamics of the model and with national prices found for GC and WC scenarios via sensitivity analysis, we come close, but not enough to reach the respective council's objectives: 17% for renewable energies and 16% for energy savings. Therefore, additional iteratives simulations were performed to attain the objectives, but the national GC and WC prices found were extremely high meaning that the achievement of the objectives should not be based on sole mechanism, but accompanied by other policies like in scenarios 7 or 9.
scenarios, where all -or almost all -environmental objectives are achieved. We notice, however, that despite of similar electricity production levels in these three scenarios, green electricity is lowest in WC+CO2 ETS, while fossil-fuel based generation is strongly reduced in WC+GC+CO2 ETS and WC+CO2 ETS+GC, since the introduction of GC prices still further encourages green electricity production.
The scenarios that include all environmental policies (WC+GC+CO2 ETS and WC+CO2 ETS+GC)
reduce the fossil-fuel based electricity generation by around 460 TWh in 2020, compared to scenario CO2 ETS. As a consequence, in the presence of other environmental policies, future CO 2 allowance cap under ETS should probably be reduced for the electricity sector in order to account for the possible decrease of polluting electricity production. We notice also that the CO2 ETS carbon price signal alone does not stimulate sufficiently green electricity nor induce savings in the electricity production. This brings a strong rationale for introducing specific support policies and economic instruments for any further development of renewable energies and energy savings. 
CONCLUSION
The methodology employed in the study allows for a comprehensive evaluation of the possible interactions among the different objectives for 2020: i. the reduction of 20% of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), ii. the saving of 20% of the energy consumption and iii. a share of 20% of renewable energies in the total energy consumption. In line with the quantitative objectives fixed by the Commission, energy savings and renewable energy objectives in the study are feasible with the national quota systems -WC and GC systems -while the CO 2 emission reductions are carried out through the ETS. We have calculated, therefore, the respective implicit national and European prices as a function of a set of consistent scenarios. Additionally, supposing the trading of certificates among the European countries, we expose the European WC and GC prices to attain the respective objectives. This may drive further research towards the analysis of the advantages of the creation of integrated WC and GC markets in Europe.
The two scenarios WC+CO2 ETS+GC and WC+GC+CO2 ETS, which represent different sequences for introducing the CO2 ETS or GC constraint, show comparable results in terms of environmental efficiency. From the economic point of view, WC+CO2 ETS+GC seems less costly since the carbon price signal created in CO2 ETS (in combination with WC prices) has a stronger impact in terms of magnitude on the reduction of compliance cost with the renewable target than the GC prices have on the compliance costs of ETS participants. Nevertheless, the two quota systems (GC and WC) reduce significantly the European marginal emissions reduction cost and, consequently, the compliance costs for ETS participants. This is also confirmed by the changes in the electricity production mix, where the implementation of all environmental policies reduces significantly the use of fossil-fuel based electricity generation and, consequently, CO 2 emissions. Furthermore, the sole carbon price signal, in the scenarios CO2 ETS or CO2 total, is clearly insufficient for stimulating renewable energies and energy savings to the level required by EU policy, which confirms once again the need for specific policies targeting these two areas. 
